Tuesday, July 17, 2018

All-too-Common Problem and a Novel Solution

In May 2018, WorkCompCentral reported the Iowa Commission to Fine Parties to Last-Minute Work Comp Settlements. The story emanated from a publication and order of the Iowa Division of Workers' Compensation. The fine looks like a sanction, in fact it is referred to as such in the publication that precedes the order. 

The new process is set to begin July 1, and will require a monetary fine from parties to a case "where settlements are reported to the Division less than 24 hours before the scheduled start time of the hearing." It is not inconsequential; the fine is $300.00. The process was adopted based upon the Iowa District Court system imposing a similar sanction. The publication explains that the Iowa Division has "recently experienced an increase in late settlements." These late settlements, it says, "strains" the State's "diminishing resources."

I recall a Florida Circuit Court judge from my youth, who had a similar antipathy to late cancellations regarding motion hearings. Attorneys were allowed to coordinate motion hearings on his calendar with the help of a judicial assistant. The assistant would ask each time for the title of the motion. If the answer was "motion to compel discovery" or anything suggesting a similar purpose, the assistant would warn "if you resolve the issue, you must cancel this hearing by 5:00 the day prior. If you do not, you must appear in person for the motion hearing even though the motion is resolved." 

I had the displeasure of sitting fifteen minutes one afternoon with that judge. We (opposing counsel, the judge and myself) amiably discussed baseball, the Florida Gators, and the weather. Counsel and I had resolved the issue in the motion, but we had done so the morning of the hearing. Our entreaty that we cancel and not waste the judge's time fell on deaf ears. Having failed to cancel the day prior, we wasted our time and client's money travelling to the courthouse, awaiting our turn, and discussing pleasantries for 15 minutes. The judge was fastidious in making sure we spent the full 15 minutes, after we had already traveled and waited our turn in the anteroom. 

Note that I said "one afternoon." That never happened to me again. I may not be the brightest bulb in the box, but I do learn reasonably quickly. After that experience, I made my motion resolution efforts before the hearing day, and always reminded opposing counsel of the assistant's admonition and my prior experience of wasted time discussing pleasantries. I suspect that judge did not hold many such hearings, but then I guess he did not really have to (lawyers do like to talk among themselves and his reputation on those cancellation got around fairly quickly). 

"But Judge," you say, "isn't it better to settle a case than try it?" There is support for that. There is great faith in the belief that a compromise crafted by the parties is better than an edict from the judge. The feeling is that people feel better when they contribute to the outcome, the solution, of their dispute. The mediators I have known are unanimous in their contention that both parties getting "something" and none getting "everything" is a "good resolution." And, mediation is said to be the best path to that outcome (of course those mediators are perhaps partial as that is the skill they have and employ?) And, no one is arguing that resolution is not a positive path, merely that timing is important and sooner is better than later. 

In Iowa, if a settlement is submitted without the 24 hour period, then the fine of $300 will be imposed. And, the "claims that have been assessed a late settlement sanction will not have the settlement approved until the sanction has been paid." To a great extent, I suspect that most of those fines will be paid by employer/carriers, whether they know it or not. That is, if negotiations continue into the 24 hour period, that "cost" is likely to be added to the settlement demand whether tacit or otherwise. 

That seems to be contemplated by the order, which requires 
"The sanction shall be assessed in equal proportionate shares against the claimant and the self-insured employer or the insurance carrier(s), unless the parties reach a different arrangement among themselves as part of the settlement for payment of the sanction."
The Iowa Division is striving to make sure everyone is informed of this new policy. It issued the May 2018 Order, and published it on its website. And, it announced it plans to provide that order to all parties in contested matters when a hearing notice is issues with a date after July 1, 2018. I am confident that several penalties will be paid, word will spread, and lawyers will likely adjust their practices (as I did with the motion judge above). And, the Division has left itself some room to be lenient if it wishes, noting that the sanction may be waived if "good cause" is shown. 

What is not clear from the publication or order is how 24 hours notice is of benefit to the judges or the state. I have presided over a few cases in the last 16 years. Many times, I left work in the afternoon knowing that my docket the following morning had a specific number of "confirmed" trials. And, many times I found that by 9:00 that next morning all of them would have resolved. Even the ones that we were told the prior afternoon had "no chance of resolving." 

And, when that occurred, I still found plenty to do with my day. There are always motions and settlements and stipulations to review. There are always orders to draft, proof, and upload. Say what you want about this job, but don't ever imagine it is boring. It is never boring. So, I find myself wondering what benefit the 24 hours notice will serve. 

Of course, there is one instance in which that is obvious. In Florida, many judges travel to counties in their district and conduct trials. Those events are often an hour's drive or more from the district office. It is admittedly frustrating to drive, often fighting morning traffic, to a remote destination only to find that the lawyers have spoken and resolved the case "on the courthouse steps." That eventuality often results in essentially a lost half day of work, wasted on needless driving, traffic stress, and expense. In that context, knowing the day before would be helpful, and would perhaps increase efficiency. 

However, it would be really helpful if parties to litigation would endeavor to meet a deadline of thirty days prior to trial. If parties resolve issues or settle, and the OJCC were be notified thirty days before the scheduled mediation or hearing, then that appointment could potentially be used by some other parties for some other case. But, in order to afford someone else the use of that "cancellation" time, there is the need for due process and that includes an appropriate amount of notice. 

I have voiced this idea at many lectures over the years. I consistently hear that it is both unreasonable and unrealistic to expect the parties to resolve issues 30 days prior to mediation or trial. But, consider that such a 30 day deadline is no different, in fact, than the deadline of the actual mediation or trial. If you do not resolve issues or settle before trial, then the trial is convened. (Mediation is the same). That does not mean parties cannot still resolve or settle after trial, but the point of resolution is often that you are not put through the expense, risk, and stress of the mediation or trial. 

There is no difference between a deadline on August 2, 2018 and a deadline September 2, 2018. Either could be the parties "deadline."  One is earlier than the other, but each is merely an arbitrary date by which the work must be done. But, only if there is an effect given to that deadline. There has never been a deadline, that I know of, that was convenient. We all live with deadlines and most of us do not like them. We tend to put things off until the deadline (most college term papers are written the night before or morning that they are due). So, perhaps the Iowa effort is simply to change the deadline. It changes perspective of parties as to how much time they have. They used to think of trial time as a deadline and will now think of 5:00 the day before instead. Perhaps it will eliminate needless travel for judges, or otherwise facilitate better use of time and other resources (hearing rooms, court reporters, etc.). 

But, perhaps it is also a harbinger of better planning overall. Perhaps with the appropriate motivation, culture, and practice would change our actions so that better communication occurs earlier and late cancellations are reduced or eliminated? It will be interesting to see how the Iowa experiment turns out. Will the litigation process work more efficiently with earlier deadlines, and a financial incentive? 

Sunday, July 15, 2018

Are You Innumerate?

Literacy is a topic that frequently garners attention. It is axiomatic that understanding how to read and write are important skills for members of a society. A quick Internet search will yield many analyses and comparisons of literacy rates, comparing groups, nations, and even professions. Recently the British Broadcasting Service (BBC) published an article regarding a similar, but less publicized, concern of society: becoming innumerate. No, the opposite of innumerate is seemingly not numerate, though one thesaurus lists that as an antonym. 

The BBC argues that numerical proficiency is a societal imperative, and sounds the alarm regarding challenges that we face regarding mathematical ability. It notes that currently "most of us" are acquainted with and use math in our daily lives. We use it to "handle bank accounts, evaluate choices in the supermarket, make estimates, and spot errors." But, this is not the end of our engagement of numbers and math. The BBC contends we similarly engage "our number sense when we decorate a room, bake a cake, go out for a meal, or pop down to the shops."

The perceived problem is a diminishing societal mathematical knowledge or fluency, secondary to the tools now commonly at our disposal. As a society, it seems, we are increasingly reliant upon calculators, computers, and programs. We are devolving from mathematical proficiency in the "simple maths," and in our ability to conceptualize calculations and comparisons. 

The BBC argues that these skills are critical for us individually. It cites examples in which math knowledge are critical, including determination of the actual cost of a car (purchase versus lease, life-cost of fuel or maintenance, etc.), comparing prices, adjusting recipes to feed a particular number, and more. It contends that "numeracy is how we interpret and apply our mathematical knowledge to the world around us." Numeracy is "the confidence and skill to use numbers and mathematical approaches in all aspects of life," according to National Numeracy, a charity promoting awareness of and improvement in numeracy. It contends that numeracy compliments literacy, and that both "are needed to function fully in modern life." 

This topic caught my attention because I have spent many hours over the years dealing with lawyers on topics of math, particularly in the realm of calculating benefits, reducing sums to present value, calculating statutory penalties and interest, and more. Lawyers are perceived as notoriously poor at mathematics. A recent Above the Law post posits "we’ve long known that law is a refuge for people who are afraid of numbers." In the hours I have spent both learning and explaining math to lawyers, I have lamented that many do lack basic mathematical skills. As an aside, math has always challenged me personally, as have statistics, writing, and public speaking. I cannot think of anything that came to me naturally, that is without a great deal of effort and practice. 

The BBC contends that data supports poor numeracy skills influence people's lives. It suggests that there are both career impacts and health impacts. Examples include inability to understand interest calculations, currency conversions, and even splitting a "bar tab with friends." Not only are people challenged with the calculation of product costs, they are not appropriately prepared to compare effective costs, such as "between two mortgages or even two differently-sized cans of soda." Thus, as consumers, those who are innumerate face a series of challenges. Though the article mentions health impacts, there is little explanation. Perhaps, those effects might involve calculating daily caloric intake, body mass monitoring, blood pressure, etc. Though all of those are numeric, perhaps no one really does math on them daily (sorry to those who thing the calorie listings on restaurant menus will solve American obesity). 

The more imperative point, however, is that researchers believe that "the problem seems to be getting worse." Researchers have devised testing for "numeracy proficiency." They report that "scores of 16-65 year-olds in the US is significantly below average." This may be because schools are note emphasizing math, or perhaps the "new math" is not living up to the promises?

So, we are dependent on our smart phones in yet another way. That is troubling. But, furthermore there is a promise of coming artificial intelligence, a more intrusive, intelligent, and pervasive invasion of technology than we have yet seen. The BBC quotes one scholar who believes that "we are close to the moment when machines will help not just with arithmetic calculations but with numerical reasoning.” The scholar quoted by the BBC notes that calculators have thus far replaced our need for many mental efforts. But, as yet, we have been required partners in the application of math to the problems which surround us in our daily lives.

Think of the car example above, not just comparing the monthly payment of lease versus buy, but the monthly cost based on fuel consumption, maintenance, etc. Today, you might use a calculator to reason that analysis. But, what if you could just ask "Siri, which car is the better option if I drive it for "x" years, an average of "y" annual miles?" What if Cortana could reply to such a query and ask "how much of "y" will be highway and how much city?" What if Alexa could reply and ask "have you considered the insurance and storage (parking) costs? You should consider ride sharing apps instead." Should Google suggest features and options to maximize vehicle enjoyment (radio, seat covers) or to minimize cost (mileage, maintenance schedule)? What will these AI components do for (to?) us?

An intriguing, but overly slapstick, film addressed this in 2006, Idiocracy (trailer here). In it, the hero (Luke Wilson) volunteers to be cryogenically, experimentally frozen. When he awakens 500 years later, he discovers that "evolution" can work both ways. This "common Joe" soldier of the 21st Century finds himself the smartest person on the planet as a result of the devolution of mankind. It is dystopian and interesting, slapstick and sophomoric. But it does illustrate a potential seemingly alluded to by the BBC. 

Our world is evolving. The news prognosticates that calculators and phones have decreased our mathematical abilities already. Therefore, there is conjecture the challenges will be increasingly difficult for us. Because we are delegating so much to these machines, we are perhaps losing the impetus to either check the computer output, or to challenge it. A professor told BBC that it is imperative that we understand more than the outcome or solution. It is perhaps critical that we "question where the figures come from.” That subject has been oft-studied as regards price tags, comparisons, and shopping, for example see Psychological Studies on Pricing.

At least for now, the human must remain in the equation. A computer can seamlessly produce an invoice or bill, but the foundation therefore (setting up the formula, selecting the appropriate variables) must be verified by the human. The quoted professor notes "a waiter at a restaurant might hand your table the wrong bill," which a human could check, but artificial intelligence may not yet be up to that task (you know you had the "tofu surprise" selected because of the calorie count printed on the menu, but the bill presented is for an evil, callous, rib-eye steak with mashed potatoes). The "set up" of the problem (what eaten) will drive the outcome (price billed), and in that computers could make ineffective selections. You know what you ate (trust me, eat tofu and you will know it, even if it is not the "surprise"), but the computer or AI does not. If the "set up" is thus flawed, then so will the outcome, or bill, be flawed. That's not because the math is wrong, but because the manner in which the equation is set up may be inappropriate for the issue that is to be addressed. 

The authors submit that we should address this societal concern in 3 steps. The first is relatively simple, personally decline to rely upon the calculator or smart phone. They suggest that we "do basic calculations in your head or on paper." Admittedly, that is a challenge for sum (sic) who have either not explored math or have had skills atrophy in the age of technology. Second, we must question numerical outputs such as statistics; there must be an intellectual effort focused upon understanding the structure of equations and thereby the context of results. Finally, they suggest that we make conscious decisions about when and how computers might help us with understanding and appreciating numbers, and conversely when it remains appropriate for us to instead challenge our own grey cells. 

The contention is that we must not blindly rely upon the technology that affords us calculations and results. We must instead remain skeptical, "pitting quantitative analysis against what we’re told is true." The implications of reliance, atrophy, and ambivalence regarding math and numbers is purportedly as important as retaining our ability to read. And, given the ubiquitous nature of microprocessors in our lives, and the ever evolving computer intelligence, perhaps we need to make these decisions sooner rather than later, while we are still smart enough both want to and be able to?

Thursday, July 12, 2018

Statutory, Inherent, or Delegated Authority

They say that unwanted tasks roll downhill. Some in the military have even waxed poetic on the point. As Ella Fitzgerald sang, "into each life some rain must fall," and that means we all get some tasks which we would perhaps enjoy less than others. But, I digress.

Does a Florida Judge of Compensation Claims have authority to conduct proceedings, render findings, and determine the amount of attorneys fees that are appropriate for a successful appeal of a workers' compensation matter? The quick answer is "certainly," and if you asked any grey-headed workers' compensation attorney that is the answer you would get. But if you asked "where does that authority come from?" those attorneys might not respond so quickly. 

After some thought, it is likely that their authority would be the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 9.180, specifically (i)(3), which states:
"If the court determines that an appellate fee is due, the lower tribunal shall have jurisdiction to conduct hearings and consider evidence regarding the amount of the attorney fee and costs due at any time after the mandate is issued"
This post is largely about our constitutional republic and some constitutional constructs that are worthy of understanding. The power of government here comes from the people. Those powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const., Amend. X. Many powers have been assumed by the federal government nonetheless, pursuant to broad grants of authority such as the Interstate Commerce Clause, and the Necessary and Proper Clause. Some argue that its assumption of power has been inappropriate. Further, the U.S. Supreme Court has concluded and explained that the powers granted to each branch are similarly constrained by the Constitution, that there is a "separation of powers" under which each branch must mind its business, and avoid interfering with the responsibilities of other branches.

Thus, some powers and authority are left delegated to the states (the separation between federal and state authority is referred to as "federalism," a horizontal demarcation similar to the vertical demarcation that is "separation of powers"). More specifically even, the Florida Constitution declares "All political power is inherent in the people." Fla. Const. art. I, Sec. 1. And, the power of government "shall be divided into legislative, executive, and judicial branches." Fla. Const. art. II, Sec. 3. That section continues "No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein." Thus, "separation of powers" in the Florida Constitution is not inference or interpretation, it is seemingly clear.

Separation of powers has been discussed in Florida workers' compenstation. In 2004 that issue was critical when The Florida Bar Workers' Compensation Section asked the Florida Supreme Court to approve amendments to the Rules of Workers' Compensation Procedure. Those rules had been adopted by the Court in 1973, and for thirty years the process and procedure of workers' compensation litigation followed those rules. This is discussed further in Separation of Powers - An Interesting Analysis.

Perhaps the most intriguing portion of the Court's 2004 decision is not the detailed explanation of how those Rules came to be, came to be endorsed by the legislature, came to be accepted far and wide, though that is all interesting. Most intriguing, however, is the Court's conclusion regarding separation of powers. Clearly, no judge of compensation claims is a "court," and as clearly only the courts are under the authority of the Florida Supreme Court. Noting that, a Supreme Court that adopted and amended workers' compensation litigation rules for decades concluded:
"we find that this Court has no authority under the Florida Constitution, nor has this Court ever had the constitutional authority to promulgate rules of practice and procedure for this executive entity. (Emphasis added)."
In Hans Christian Anderson's The Emperor's New Clothes, everyone went along when the emperor thought he had clothes. It took a fresh look, a fresh perspective, a child, to say "but he hasn't got anything on." And similarly, it took the Division of Administrative Hearings enacting workers' compensation procedural rules in 2003 for a fresh look at the Supreme Court rules, and a realization that a multitude had blindly assumed efficacy of the rules for three decades. 

Over those same decades, there have been various Florida appellate decisions that discuss the authority or jurisdiction of Judges of Compensation Claims (or "JCCs," formerly "Deputy Commissioners" and "Judges of Industrial Claims"). In 1983, the Florida Supreme Court concluded in Smith v. Piezo Technology, 427 So.2d 182 (Fla 1983):
"The deputy commissioner is vested only with certain limited quasi-judicial powers relating to the adjudication of claims for compensation and benefits." 
In 1999, the District Court reiterated that JCCs operate "under a grant of quasi-judicial power from the Legislature, supplemented only by rules of procedure applicable to it adopbed by the supreme court." Alachua County Adult Detention Center v. Alford, 727 So.2d 388 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Supplemented by the rules that the Court later concluded it never had authority to promulgate. Deciding Alford, and other cases, even the First DCA never took issue with the separation of powers issue. 

In 2004, the District Court returned to the subject of JCC authority in Pace v. Miami Dade County School Board, 868 So.2d 1286 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). The Court was direct, specific, and succinct: 
"A JCC has no authority or jurisdiction beyond what is specifically conferred by statute.” Farhangi v. Dunkin Donuts, 728 So.2d 772, 773 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). “Unlike a court of general jurisdiction, a judge of compensation claims does not have inherent judicial power but only the power expressly conferred by chapter 440.” McFadden v. Hardrives Constr., Inc., 573 So.2d 1057, 1059 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)."
So, we return now to Rule 9.180(i)(3), which says that "the lower tribunal" (in this context the JCC) "shall have jurisdiction," with "jurisdiction" meaning "authority." However, the District Court has been quite clear that the only authority of a JCC is "what is specifically conferred by statute.” So, accepting that this rule says there is jurisdiction and that this rule is not a statute, I reiterate the original question "Does a Florida Judge of Compensation Claims have authority to conduct proceedings, render findings, and determine the amount of attorneys fees that are appropriate for a successful appeal of a workers' compensation matter?"

It would seem that if the answer to that question is "yes," then there must needs be a statute that says so. Smith, Alford, Pace, Farhangi, McFadden. Section 440.271 addresses "appeal of order of" the JCC. There is nothing in that statutory section regarding the jurisdiction discussed in Rule 9.180(i)(3). Section 440.34 addresses "attorney's fees; costs." That section, 440.34(2), discusses a consideration of the "benefits secured by the attorney," which might infer authority if it is the claimant who has prevailed upon appeal and thus, through appeal, "secured benefits." However, the section includes other language that seems far more related to the award of trial fees.

Section 440.34(5) is specific to appellate process. It provides that in the event of "proceedings" for "review of any claim, award or compensation order," then "the court may award the injured employee or dependent an attorney’s fee to be paid by the employer or carrier, in its discretion, which shall be paid as the court may direct." (Emphasis added). There is no language in this section that appears to afford a JCC any jurisdiction as seemingly described in Rule 9.180(i)(3). And, in light of the Supreme Court's clear enunciations in 2004, there remains no doubt that neither Judges of Compensation Claims nor the OJCC is a "court," and thus are not the subject of this subsection. 

And so, the question persists, "does a Florida Judge of Compensation Claims have authority" to determine the fee amount on behalf of the appellate court, pursuant to its instruction and order?

There are those who would perhaps refer to Section 440.33(1), which says the JCC may:
"do all things conformable to law which may be necessary to enable the judge effectively to discharge the duties of her or his office"
The authority conveyed by this section has been the subject of various appellate decisions. See Horizon Healthcare v. Murphy, 660 So.2d 1065 (Fla 1st DCA 1995)(440.33(1)(supported the authority to impose sanctions); Delgado v. J.C. Concrete, 721 So.2d 353 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)("grant protective orders and, conversely, motions to compel independent medical examinations"); but see Karell v. Miami Airport Hilton, 668 So.2d 227 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)("the E/C can point to no specific statutory provision conferring this authority upon the JCC, they nevertheless argue that the requisite jurisdictional authority can be implied from several statutory provisions" including 440.33(1)).

Most would agree, the Court has authority to award a fee. Section 440.34(5) is seemingly clear and specific in that regard. But, the authority of a JCC to award an appellate attorney fee appears more elusive. Can an Article V. Florida Court delegate its authority to an executive branch official? The answer to that seems perhaps as clear as the Supreme Court's conclusion that the legislature may not delegate rule-making authority to the Court. Is the JCCs' jurisdiction actually "only the power expressly conferred by chapter 440" as the Court has repeatedly concluded, or is that jurisdiction subject to augmentation at the behest, the delegation, of the Court? In that regard, if the JCC acts beyond actual authority ("ultra vires"), then is the Court that directs that action an accessory?

And, with that, we end where we started. The question, it seems, remains "does a Florida Judge of Compensation Claims have authority to conduct proceedings, render findings, and determine the amount of attorneys fees that are appropriate for a successful appeal of a workers' compensation matter?" The answer is not "yes" merely because "they always have." That answer is akin to your mom's "because I said so," it didn't work when you were a kid and it won't work now.

"Because they always have" was not a sufficient answer with the Court's rules of procedure or the emperor's new clothes, and it is not the answer here. The answer is seemingly not "yes" the Court can delegate its authority, as delegation perhaps violates separation of powers. And so, the ultimate answer is "I don't know."

Of course, the practice may proceed for a variety of reasons. First, the Court has been ordering the process and following its appellate rule for years. The Court believes it may delegate, and that Court has virtual exclusive appellate jurisdiction over workers' compensation cases. Recently, in Abuse of Discretion, I noted how even intermediate appellate courts could be the final word, infallible, because they are last. Second, the current practice is expedient, and the Florida Supreme Court has exalted expediency over construction at least once, see Castellanos v. Next Door Company. 192 So.3d 431 (Fla. 2016). Finally, of course, the question would never be reviewed unless some party or some First District Judge raised it. In light of the years of habit, and the expediency, each of these is doubtful.

If the question were ever raised, and the Court concluded it has enforced an inappropriate paradigm for years, the effect would have to be addressed. In 2004, the Florida Supreme Court was aware of that, and included in its Rules abrogation a limitation that the decision would only apply prospectively, to the future and not the past. The Court explained that this would prevent "an upheaval of decades of workers' compensation law." The Court, in correcting its misstep, preventing upheaval and consequence of its perception and rule imposition.

It is an intriguing question, "can a JCC award an appellate attorney fee." It is the sort of thing a law professor might enjoy tormenting a class with. It is a curiosity, a conflict, and a puzzle. And, in the end, the answer remains "I don't know," which did not satisfy Mr. Hand (oblique reference Fast Times at Ridgemont High) and it may not satisfy you. But, as they say, it is what it is until some higher court says it isn't.

Tuesday, July 10, 2018

Florida' Supreme Court in Workers' Compensation

Florida workers' compensation has recently seen various supreme court decisions. Perhaps 2016 was most noteworthy, with Castellanos and Westphal. These are seen as significantly impacting the Florida system, and I hear them discussed by "insiders" of workers' compensation across the country. There are those who contend that 2016 was significant as much for First District Court decisions in cases like Miles v. City of Edgewater, 190 So.3d 171 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) and Jones v. Food Lion, 202 So.3d 964 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). 

But, the Supreme Court cases have led to conversations. One question I hear repeatedly is "how often does the Florida Supreme Court become involved in workers' compensation disputes?" That is an interesting question. One to which I have had no real answer. It is noteworthy that Florida Supreme Court involvement was more common in the early days of Florida workers' compensation.

As originally structured, the Florida dispute process was within the jurisdiction of a commission, the Industrial Relations Commission (IRC). The Commission was ultimately responsible for deciding disputes. Initially, the IRC held hearings for those disputes. Later, to facilitate that process, it employed "deputy commissioners," which were essentially similar in responsibilities to our modern Judges of Compensation Claims. Those deputies would hold hearings, consider evidence, and render rulings. If a party was unsatisfied with the outcome, it would appeal the decision to the IRC.

After Florida enacted workers' compensation in 1935, the first reference I can find to the Florida Supreme Court is Maryland Casualty v. Sutherland, 168 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1936). It describes that a party dissatisfied with the ruling of the IRC would appeal that decision to the Circuit Court (Florida's court of general jurisdiction). And, if dissatisfied with the Circuit Court decision, the party could then resort to review by the Florida Supreme Court. Of course, there were no other appellate courts in Florida at the time. It would not be until 1957 that the Florida legislature would create three District Courts of Appeal (Florida now has five).

In Sutherland, the Circuit Court affirmed the IRC order of death benefits under the new workers' compensation law (enacted in 1935), following the worker's injury and death on October 6, 1935. Florida was not among the first to legislate workers' compensation. In fact, though Florida was not last (sorry Mississippi), it was in the last five states. Thus, many states had been limiting recovery for injured workers by statutory provision of benefits for years before Sutherland was litigated under Florida's "new law."

The Court in Sutherland noted however that it had been unsuccessful finding any "precedent for us to follow in the law of workmen's (sic) compensation." The Court noted that there was no statutory provision for whom should receive death benefits if a worker died without dependents as Sutherland had. The Court concluded death benefits must be nonetheless payable to the worker's estate. Its analysis was that if no death benefits were payable without dependents, "then industry could seize upon this situation and place such men in the most hazardous places of work, knowing that if they were killed, it would cost industry nothing." Some might find that cynical?

The first constitutional challenge to Florida workers' compensation happened the next month in State ex. rel. Jacksonville Gas Co. v. Lewis, 170 So.2d 306 (Fla. 1936). This was a challenge regarding the title of the law and its contents. The challenger contended section 39 of the act was not as described in the title, and thus unconstitutional. The Supreme Court disagreed and concluded the law did not run afoul of the state constitution. 

Time passed, and Florida workers' compensation evolved. Circuit Court involvement was removed and appeals from the IRC went directly to the Supreme Court. In 1979, the legislature enacted Section 440.217 and vested jurisdiction for workers' compensation appeals in the Florida First District Court of Appeal in Tallahassee. That designation was affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court in 1980 in Rollins v. Southern Bell, 384 So.2d 650 (Fla 1980). The IRC was later abolished in 1979, the Office of Judges of Compensation Claims (OJCC) was created in the Department of Labor and Employment Security (DLES), and the litigation process remains similar to this day (except for the abolishing of DLES and the transfer of the OJCC to the Division of Administrative Hearings in 2001. 

So, until 1979, the Florida Supreme Court would be expected to have had more frequent involvement in workers' compensation. A database search revealed 337 decisions of the Florida Supreme Court that mentioned either "workers' compensation" or "workmens' compensation." That second one is clearly genderist, and that phrase has now been removed from Chapter 440, but historic decisions might nonetheless use that term. 

Of those 337, 102 are clearly not related to substantive workers' compensation issues. These include various rule revision decisions, Florida Bar complaint decisions, and even a few related to the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Fund. These mention "workers' compensation," and were therefore in the search results but were excluded from the final analysis. The distribution of the remaining 235 reported cases are as follows: 

From this cursory analysis (without reading all of the individual cases), one might conclude that 2016 was above average for published Florida Supreme Court decisions mentioning workers' compensation; the average over the last 40 years is 6 per year. Some will read the 2016 cases listed below and conclude some are not appropriately included. But, undertaking that in-depth analysis of any particular year would only be appropriate if such analysis were performed for each of the 235 cases. Since that is not undertaken for all years, that scrutiny of any single year is not appropriate in this "overview" analysis. 

And, one might conclude that Florida Supreme Court published decisions that mention workers' compensation are decreasing in volume. Dividing the last 40 years (since the abolition of the IRC, the advent of First District Court jurisdiction) into four decades affords support for that conclusion. Though the most recent decade included 2018, which is now only half-concluded), the average of 2.5 Supreme Court cases per year is notably lower than any prior ten year period.

It is thus perhaps difficult to conclude that Florida Supreme Court workers' compensation written decisions are increasing. Certainly, 2016 was above that overall average, with 7 published opinions. However, that volume would nonetheless appear to be an exception for that ten year period, and not the rule. For those who might want to count themselves, the data relied upon is below.

91. Eady v. Medical Personnel Pool 1979
229. Crippen v. Sunland Center 1979
237. Highsmith v. Woodson 1979
242. Tinsley v. City of St. Petersburg 1979
1. International Paper Co. v. McKinney 1980
23. Rollins v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co. 1980
57. Samaha v. State 1980
113. Strother v. Morrison Cafeteria 1980
115. Croft v. Pinkerton-Hayes Lumber Co. 1980
122. Redding v. Cobia Boat Co. 1980
127. Kerce v. Coca-Cola Company-Foods Division 1980
154. Media General Corp. v. Curry 1980
157. American Bankers Ins. Co. v. Little 1980
162. American Beryllium Co. v. Stringer 1980
186. D’Angelo Plastering Co. v. Isaac 1980
200. Favre v. Capeletti Bros., Inc. 1980
211. Special Disability Trust Fund v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. 1980
249. Fuller Lumber Co. v. Parler 1980
86. Houle v. Asphalt Sealing and Stripping Co., Inc. 1981
110. Hacker v. St. Petersburg Kennel Club 1981
114. Motchkavitz v. L. C. Boggs Industries, Inc. 1981
132. City of Miami v. Rosenberg 1981
155. Iglesia v. Floran 1981
160. Silvera v. Miami Wholesale Grocery, Inc. 1981
172. Wright v. Gulf and Western Food Products 1981
220. Oglesby v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co. 1981
288. Cauley v. City of Jacksonville 1981
142. Lovett v. Gore Newspapers Co. 1982
161. Gulfstream Land & Development Corp. v. Wilkerson 1982
8. Mahoney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 1983
17. Acton v. Fort Lauderdale Hosp. 1983
20. Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Abernathy 1983
35. Smith v. Piezo Technology and Professional Adm’rs 1983
70. Sosa v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. 1983
109. Caravasios v. M.W. Spates Const. Co. 1983
141. Prahl Bros., Inc. v. Phillips 1983
78. Sasso v. Ram Property Management 1984
100. Nikko Gold Coast Cruises v. Gulliford 1984
138. Norwood Shell, Inc. v. Forbing 1984
139. Morain v. Publix Supermarket 1984
140. Rudolph v. Miami Dolphins, Ltd. 1984
164. Kimbrell v. Paige 1984
34. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Norman 1985
60. Newton v. McCotter Motors, Inc. 1985
65. O’Neil v. Department of Transp. 1985
105. L.M. Duncan & Sons, Inc. v. City of Clearwater 1985
111. Booher v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc. 1985
117. Orr v. Trask 1985
118. Acosta v. Kraco, Inc. 1985
137. Mobil v. Trask 1985
156. Travieso v. Travieso 1985
173. Bredy v. Turner Patrol & Detective Agency, Inc. 1985
308. Everton v. Willard 1985
2. Shipp v. Workers’ Compensation Admin. Trust Fund 1986
48. Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen. Const. Co. 1986
53. Lawton v. Alpine Engineered Products, Inc. 1986
75. Daniel v. Holmes Lumber Co. 1986
133. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Boynton 1986
136. International Hosp. v. Seymour 1986
143. City of Fort Lauderdale v. Sledge 1986
144. Farm Stores, Inc. v. Harvey 1986
266. Florida Steel Corp. v. Adaptable Developments, Inc. 1986
116. Dayron Corp. v. Morehead 1987
125. Streeter v. Sullivan 1987
167. Coon v. Continental Ins. Co. 1987
171. Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone 1987
185. Brackenridge v. Ametek, Inc. 1987
226. Clausell v. Hobart Corp. 1987
286. Dionese v. City of West Palm Beach 1987
72. Tarver v. Evergreen Sod Farms, Inc. 1988
99. Scott v. Otis Elevator Co. 1988
119. Nikula v. Michigan Mut. Ins. 1988
158. Harris v. State 1988
208. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chambers 1988
293. Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc. 1988
12. Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Securities, Inc. 1989
19. Barragan v. City of Miami 1989
32. Gator Freightways, Inc. v. Roberts 1989
38. Weisfeld v. Weisfeld 1989
63. Department of Public Health, Div. of Risk Management v. Wilcox 1989
77. Leon County School Bd. v. Grimes 1989
98. De Ayala v. Florida Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. 1989
106. Cypress Creek Nursery v. Eagle 1989
149. USS Agri-Chemicals, a Div. of USX Corp. v. Waddell 1989
230. Hullinger v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. 1989
275. State v. Simpson 1989
18. Theis v. City of Miami 1990
41. Manfredo v. Employer’s Cas. Ins. Co. 1990
66. Scott v. Otis Elevator Co. 1990
102. D.L. Cullifer and Son, Inc. v. Martinez 1990
120. Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services v. Bonanno 1990
148. Halifax Paving, Inc. v. Scott & Jobalia Const. Co., Inc. 1990
190. Frazier v. Baker Material Handling Corp. 1990
235. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. of Shelby, Ohio v. Smith 1990
285. Thornber v. City of Ft. Walton Beach 1990
310. Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom 1990
37. Martinez v. Scanlan 1991
134. Roe v. City Investing/General Development Corp. 1991
176. In re Estate of Platt 1991
180. Gormley v. GTE Products Corp. 1991
196. Florida Power Corp. v. Seminole County 1991
280. Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, and F 1991
25. Mandico v. Taos Const., Inc. 1992
49. University of Florida v. Massie 1992
56. Sibley v. Adjustco, Inc. 1992
88. City of Holmes Beach v. Grace 1992
121. Holder v. Keller Kitchen Cabinets 1992
175. Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bourke 1992
247. Melendez v. State 1992
265. Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Brewer 1992
291. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Acosta 1992
36. Eller v. Shova 1993
59. Commercial Coatings of Northwest Florida, Inc. v. Pensacola Concrete Const. Co., Inc. 1993
62. Weber v. Dobbins 1993
83. Lee v. City of Jacksonville 1993
90. Cash v. Universal Rivet, Inc. 1993
92. Garcia v. Carmar Structural, Inc. 1993
130. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Fox 1993
147. University of Miami v. Echarte 1993
314. Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Corp. 1993
47. Zundell v. Dade County School Bd. 1994
82. Jones v. Chiles 1994
108. City of Miami v. Bell 1994
197. Weygant v. Fort Myers Lincoln Mercury, Inc. 1994
212. Thompson v. State 1994
320. Department of Revenue v. Kuhnlein 1994
3. Ramos v. Univision Holdings, Inc. 1995
43. Williams v. Fort Pierce Tribune and Claims Center 1995
68. Keith v. News & Sun Sentinel Co. 1995
74. Holmes County School Bd. v. Duffell 1995
95. Clair v. Glades County Bd. of Com’rs 1995
193. Keith v. News & Sun Sentinel Co. 1995
257. De La Rosa v. Zequeira 1995
24. Barry v. Burdines 1996
103. Domino’s Pizza v. Gibson 1996
128. Millinger v. Broward County Mental Health Div. and Risk Management 1996
181. Cramer v. Broedell Plumbing Supply 1996
206. Department of Educ. v. Roe 1996
281. In re Estate of Smith 1996
306. Acosta v. Richter 1996
312. Kinney System, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co. 1996
313. Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in School Funding, Inc. v. Chiles 1996
4. Hastings v. Demming 1997
11. Broward v. Jacksonville Medical Center 1997
61. Escambia County Sheriff’s Dept. v. Grice 1997
93. Recchi America Inc. v. Hall 1997
227. Galen of Florida, Inc. v. Braniff 1997
252. Forgione v. Dennis Pirtle Agency, Inc. 1997
260. Murray v. Department of Transp. 1997
284. Y.H. Investments, Inc. v. Godales 1997
299. State v. Mark Marks, P.A. 1997
21. Florida Dept. of Corrections v. Culver 1998
39. Lee v. Wells Fargo Armored Services 1998
89. Wal-Mart Stores v. Campbell 1998
182. Rea v. 7-11 Stores/Southland Corp. 1998
192. Paulk v. Palm Beach County School Bd. 1998
201. Mims v. Lipton Toyota, Inc. 1998
15. Deen v. Quantum Resources, Inc. 1999
85. City of Clearwater v. Acker 1999
169. Boulis v. Florida Dept. of Transp. 1999
26. Turner v. PCR, Inc. 2000
30. City of Hollywood v. Lombardi 2000
71. Dixon v. GAB Business Services, Inc. 2000
123. U.S. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Cimino 2000
177. Salters v. State 2000
202. Florida Dept. of Transp. v. Johns 2000
207. Florida Plastering v. Alderman 2000
217. Rollins v. Pizzarelli 2000
267. Trapp v. State 2000
268. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pinnacle Medical, Inc. 2000
297. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rudnick 2000
28. Florida Dept. of Labor & Employment Sec. v. Boise Cascade Corp. 2001
64. State v. Herny 2001
69. Swartz v. McDonald’s Corp. 2001
94. Jones v. ETS of New Orleans, Inc. 2001
97. Gilbert v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc. 2001
112. Florida Dept. of Transp. v. Juliano 2001
129. Florida HRS Dist. II v. Pickard 2001
178. Ford v. Conklin 2001
179. Florida Dept. of Transp. v. Hogan 2001
221. Florida Power Corp. v. Garcia 2001
294. Mitchell v. Moore 2001
302. United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez 2001
10. U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson 2002
248. Coregis Ins. Co. v. Mosquito Control Special Taxing Dist. 2002
276. Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Estate of Shelley 2002
300. Roberts ex rel. Estate of Roberts v. Tejada 2002
166. Humana Worker’s Compensation Services v. Home Emergency Services, Inc. 2003
241. Grenitz v. Tomlian 2003
33. Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes of Florida, Inc. 2004
40. Taylor v. School Bd. of Brevard County 2004
44. Travelers Indem. Co. v. PCR Inc. 2004
9. Aguilera v. Inservices, Inc. 2005
22. Florida Div. Of Workers’ Compensation v. Cagnoli 2005
213. Malu v. Security Nat. Ins. Co. 2005
219. Maggio v. Florida Dept. of Labor and Employment Security 2005
316. Acker v. Acker 2005
13. Jones v. Martin Electronics, Inc. 2006
31. Aravena v. Miami-Dade County 2006
124. Steadman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. 2006
184. Summit Claims Management, Inc. v. Lawyers Exp. Trucking, Inc. 2006
277. Schmidt v. McDonough 2006
27. Bakerman v. The Bombay Co., Inc. 2007
231. Florida Dept. of Corrections v. Abril 2007
29. Sanders v. City Of Orlando 2008
96. Murray v. Mariner Health 2008
183. Rigaud v. Broward General Medical Center 2008
216. Phantom of Brevard, Inc. v. Brevard County 2008
225. Deren v. State 2008
321. Florida Hosp. Waterman, Inc. v. Buster 2008
191. Saleeby v. Rocky Elson Const., Inc. 2009
52. Bifulco v. Patient Business & Financial Services, Inc. 2010
58. Florida’s Sheriff’s Workers’ Compensation Self-Insurance Fund v. Florida Dept. of Financial Services 2010
218. Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., Inc. 2010
234. Perera v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. 2010
243. Florida Dept. of State v. Mangat 2010
278. Wald v. Grainger 2011
279. Bionetics Corp. v. Kenniasty 2011
174. Petty v. Florida Ins. Guar. Ass’n 2012
209. City of Palm Bay v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 2013
223. Geico Gen. Ins. Co. v. Virtual Imaging Services, Inc. 2013
244. Franks v. Bowers 2013
6. Morales v. Zenith Ins. Co. 2014
79. Palm Const. Co. of West Florida v. Florida Dept. of Financial Services, Div. of Workers’ Compensation 2015
45. Richardson v. Aramark/Sedgwick CMS 2016
46. Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg 2016
51. Castellanos v. Next Door Co. 2016
153. Pfeffer v. Labor Ready Southeast, Inc. 2016
210. Diaz v. Palmetto General Hosp. 2016
282. Paton v. GEICO General Ins. Co. 2016
295. M.M. v. Florida Dept. of Children and Families 2016
16. Stewart v. Florida Workers’ Compensation Insurance Guaranty Association 2017
87. Weaver v. Myers 2017
296. Allstate Insurance Company v. Orthopedic Specialists 2017
304. Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley, etc. v. State 2017
Not Included in Calculations
131. In re Florida Workers’ Compensation Rules of Procedure 1979
50. In re Florida Workers’ Compensation Rules 1980
269. In re Florida Rules of Judicial Administration 1980
188. In re Certificate of Judicial Manpower 1980
168. The Florida Bar v. Samaha 1981
273. The Florida Bar Re Amendment to Bylaws 1981
317. The Florida Bar 1982
165. The Florida Bar v. Wooten 1984
287. The Florida Bar v. Lancaster 1984
81. The Florida Bar 1984
145. The Florida Bar v. Kirtz 1984
290. Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe 1985
301. The Florida Bar re Rules Regulating The Florida Bar 1986
322. In re Certificate of Judicial Manpower for District Courts of Appeal, Circuit Courts and County Courts, as Required by Article V, Section 9, Florida Constitution 1986
7. The Florida Bar Re Amendment to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar 6-8.3, 6-85, and Florida Bar, The, Re Amendment to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar 6-8.3, 6-8.5, and 6-11 1987
238. The Florida Bar v. Tunsil 1987
307. In re Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure 1988
67. The Florida Bar 1988
104. The Florida Bar Re Amendment to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar Chapter 6 (Legal Specialization and Educ.) 1989
187. The Florida Bar v. Flinn 1991
199. In re Certification of Judicial Manpower 1991
55. Amendments to Florida Rules of Workers’ Compensation Procedure 1992
150. The Florida Bar Re: Amendment to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar 1992
259. In re Florida Rules of Family Court Procedure 1992
262. In re Certification of Judicial Manpower 1992
263. The Florida Bar re Amendment to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 1992
272. In re Amendments to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 1992
334. The Florida Bar Re: Amendment to Florida Rules of Judicial Admin. 1992
337. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1992
204. In re Certification of Judgeships 1993
258. The Florida Bar v. Mitchell 1994
76. Amendments to Florida Rules of Workers’ Compensation 1995
84. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Workers’ Compensation Procedure 1995
255. The Florida Bar re Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar 1995
233. In re Family Law Rules of Procedure 1995
54. In re Amendments to Florida Rules of Workers’ Compensation Procedure 1996
80. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Ass’n v. McKaughan 1996
151. Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 1996
152. Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 1996
253. In re Certification of Need for Additional Judges 1996
324. In re Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar 1996
214. The Florida Bar v. Spann 1996
5. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Workers’ Compensation Procedure 1997
274. In re Certification of the Need for Additional Judges 1997
327. The Florida Bar re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 1997
256. Amendments to Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure 1998
264. The Florida Bar v. Sweeney 1998
271. The Florida Bar re Williams 1998
309. In re Amendments to the Florida Family Law Rules 1998
107. The Florida Bar v. Sayler 1998
73. Amendments to the Florida Rules of Workers’ Compensation Procedure 2000
170. Amendments to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 2000
189. The Florida Bar v. Buckle 2000
222. Amendments to the Florida Rules of Judicial Admin. 2000
311. In re Amendments to the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure 2000
318. Amendments To The Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure and Family Law Forms 2000
328. Amendments to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar 2000
270. Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar 2001
315. Amendments to the Florida Family Law Forms 2001
42. Amendments to the Florida Rules of Workers’ Compensation Procedure 2002
159. Amendments to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 2002
228. Amendment to Florida Rule of Judicial Admin. 2.130 2002
333. In re Report of Supreme Court Workgroup on Public Records 2002
336. Amendments to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 2002
101. The Florida Bar v. Kelly 2002
254. Amendments to the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure 2003
261. Amendments to the Florida Rules of Judicial Admin. (2-Year Cycle) 2003
14. Amendments to the Florida Rules of Workers’ Compensation Procedure 2004
251. In re Approval of Form For Use By Clerks of the Circuit Courts Pursuant to Rule 10-2.1(a) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar 2004
289. Amendment to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar 2004
126. Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 2005
198. In re Amendments to The Rules of Judicial Admin. (Two-Year Cycle) 2005
240. In re Approval of Application for Determination of Indigent Status Forms for Use By Clerks 2005
305. The Florida Bar v. Shankman 2005
319. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure-Conform Rules to 2004 Legislation 2005
335. In re Amendments to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar 2005
135. In re Amendments to The Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure (Out of Cycle) 2006
246. In re Amendments to the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure (Out of Cycle) 2006
163. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Ass’n v. Florida Div. of Administrative Hearings 2007
239. In re Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 2007
250. In re Approval of Application For Determination of Indigent Status Forms For Use By Clerks And Amendment To Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.984 2007
205. The Florida Bar v. Varner 2008
215. Florida House of Representatives v. Crist 2008
245. In re Approval of Application for Determination of Indigent Status Form for Use by Clerks and Amendment to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.984 2009
283. In re Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 2009
303. The Florida Bar v. Head 2010
195. In re Standard Jury Instructions In Civil Cases-Report No. 09-01 (Reorganization of the Civil Jury Instructions) 2010
224. In re Amendments to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 2011
330. In re Amendments to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, Florida Probate Rules, Florida Small Claims Rules, Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure--Electronic Filing 2012
331. In re Amendments to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, Florida Probate Rules, Florida Small Claims Rules, Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure--Electronic Filing 2012
146. Citizens Property Ins. Corp. v. San Perdido Ass’n, Inc. 2012
292. In re Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases--Report No. 2011-01 (Unlawful Retaliation) 2012
232. Samples v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass’n 2013
329. In re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar--Subchapter 4-7, Lawyer Advertising Rules 2013
203. In re Amendments to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 2014
298. The Florida Bar v. Gass 2014
323. In re Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar (Biennial Report) 2014
325. In re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar (Biennial Petition Housekeeping) 2015
326. In re Amendments To Florida Evidence Code 2017
332. In re Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar (Biennial Petition) 2017
194. In re Amendments to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 2017
236. In re Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases-Report No. 17-04 2017